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 
Using event9related brain potentials (ERPs), we explored the relationship between social 
power and emotional prosody processing. In particular, we investigated differences at early 
and late processing stages between individuals primed with high or low power. Comparable 
to previously published findings from non9primed participants, individuals primed with low 
power displayed differentially modulated P2 amplitudes in response to different emotional 
prosodies, whereas participants primed with high power failed to do so. Similarly, 
participants primed with low power showed differentially modulated amplitudes in response 
to different emotional prosodies at a later processing stage (late ERP component), whereas 
participants primed with high power did not. These ERP results suggest that high versus low 
power leads to emotional prosody processing differences at the early stage associated with 
emotional salience detection and at a later stage associated with more in9depth processing 
of emotional stimuli. 
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“The most important thing in communication is hearing what isn’t said” (Peter 
Drucker, n.d.). The ability to accurately “read” non9verbal signals conveyed through body 
language, facial expression, or tone of voice (prosody) is indeed a vital skill for successful 
communication. How meaningful signals are conveyed and understood through prosody 
(characterized through complex fluctuations of acoustic parameters such as pitch, loudness, 
voice quality, and tempo) has received increasing attention over the past few decades. 
However, while there is an extensive literature devoted to how emotions are conveyed or 
understood through prosody (see e.g., Paulmann, 2015, for review), far less is known about 
how emotional prosody processing is influenced by social psychological factors. The 
exception to this is research exploring differences in emotional prosody processing as a 
function of sex (e.g., Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003), age (e.g., 
Paulmann, Pell, & Kotz, 2008; Mitchell & Kingston, 2014) or cultural background (e.g., 
Paulmann & Uskul, 2014; Pell, Monetta, Paulmann, & Kotz, 2009; Scherer, Banse, & 
Walbott, 2001). Only recently, research has also started to explore how social power, 
typically defined as the ability to control valued resources that comprise of outcomes that are 
physical (e.g., housing), economic (e.g., promotion), or social (e.g., inclusion) (e.g., Fiske, 
1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), can impact on 
emotional prosody perception (Uskul, Paulmann, & Weick, 2016). Findings from this 
research show that both generalized sense of power measured as an individual difference 
variable as well as temporary feelings of holding high versus low power are associated with 
accuracy in recognizing emotions from voice. Specifically, individuals who hold a strong 
sense of power (Study 1) as well as those primed with feelings of powerfulness (Study 2) are 
less accurate in recognizing emotions from prosody than individuals who hold a weak sense 
of power or those primed with feelings of powerlessness (Uskul et al., 2016) (see below for 
further details); however, the underlying cause for this effect is yet unknown. The present 
investigation aims to fill this gap.  
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Emotional Prosody 
Emotional prosody perception requires the listener to pay close attention to a variety 
of emotional prosodic cues as they unfold over time. This complex process has been shown 
to involve several functionally different transient processing stages. Initially, acoustic 
attributes are extracted during sensory processing. Next, emotional significance is 
determined. Eventually, in a final step, more cognitively based operations including 
emotional meaning evaluation take place (for recent models on the time9course underlying 
these processes see, for example, Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; or 
Frühholz, Trost, & Kotz, 2016). So far, the role of contextual and individual factors on 
emotional prosodic processing is still underspecified; however, some models on vocal signal 
processing (e.g., Schirmer & Kotz, 2006) theorize that these factors can impact on all of the 
proposed stages. In the present study, we test how and if holding or lacking power can 
modulate different processing steps. If it does, this would suggest that future models of 
emotional prosody processing would need to consider the impact of top9down information 
more closely than it is currently done.   
The majority of evidence supporting multi9stage models of emotional prosody 
processing comes from research using event9related brain potentials (ERPs). Early sensory 
processing, or the extraction of acoustic cues (e.g. pitch and loudness information), has 
been linked to a negativity peaking at around 100 ms after stimulus onset. It is debated 
whether this early sensory ERP is modulated by the emotionality of a stimulus. Some studies 
presenting audio9visual stimuli suggest that emotionality does modulate the N1 (Jessen & 
Kotz, 2011; Jessen, Obleser, & Kotz, 2012; Lerner, McPartland, & Morris, 2013), although 
rare evidence also exists from studies looking at emotional prosody only (see Pinheiro et al., 
2013 for N100 emotion effects in schizophrenic patients). Subsequent ERPs have 
consistently been shown to be modulated by the emotional connotation of an auditory 
stimulus. For instance, rapid emotional salience detection (i.e., early emotional appraisal) 
has consistently been tied to the fronto9centrally distributed P2 component (e.g., Paulmann 
& Kotz, 2008; Paulmann, Bleichner, & Kotz, 2013; Schirmer, Chen, Ching, Tan, & Hong, 
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2013; Pell, Rothermich, Liu, Paulmann, Sethi, & Rigoulot, 2015). Specifically, this research 
has shown that so9called basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise) 
can be distinguished from one another and from neutral sounding stimuli within 200 ms after 
stimulus onset as reflected in differently modulated P2 amplitudes. It has been argued that 
this early emotional appraisal is linked to enhanced or preferential processing of emotional 
attributes of language stimuli; this in turn should enable the listeners to respond adequately 
and adjust their own behaviour accordingly.  
In contrast, more specific and enhanced emotional meaning evaluation has been 
linked to later, long9lasting negative (Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004; Schirmer et al., 2002, 
2005; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003; Paulmann & Pell, 2010; Paulmann, Ott, & Kotz, 2011) or 
positive (Kanske & Kotz, 2007; Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013; Pell et al., 
2015) ERP components, depending on the type of experimental design or stimuli used. For 
instance, Schirmer et al. (2013) and Paulmann et al. (2013) presented evidence 
demonstrating that sentences spoken in different emotional prosodies elicit distinct long9
lasting ERP signatures in late time9windows (400 ms post prosody onset) possibly reflecting 
processes that link emotional sentence meaning to stored emotional memory information, 
helping to establish an emotional interpretation of the stimulus. In other words, enriched 
interpretation or assessment of emotional9specific meaning is linked to this later time9window 
of processing.  
 
Social Power 
Power is a fundamental part of everyday social life and has been shown to shape 
many aspects of our interactions with others (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Maner, 
Kaschak, Jones, 2010). One definition that is commonly adopted in social psychological 
research states that power is ‘an individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by 
providing or withholding resources or administering punishments’ (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003, p. 265). Another commonly used definition further highlights the 
interpersonal consequences of social power stating that it is the degree to which an 
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individual can exert control over another (Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Social power is 
considered to be different from other hierarchical concepts such as status (i.e., respect in the 
eyes of others on the basis of one’s relative rank, see e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008) or 
dominance (i.e., actual use of power typically at the expense of other individuals, see e.g., 
Hirsh, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011).  
Individuals are believed to develop a generalized sense of power, anchored in their 
past interpersonal experiences (e.g., Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; Bugenthal, Blue, & 
Cruzcosa, 1989; Chen, Lee9Chai, & Bargh, 2001). Researchers have developed several 
measures to assess individuals’ sense of their power either as a generalized psychological 
property or in specific social relationships and groups (e.g., Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson 
& Galinsky, 2006). The sense of power can also be activated by cues in one’s social 
environment or recollections of past power9related experiences (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; 
Galinsky et al., 2003). In most past research that adopted a situational perspective on 
power, the sense of power was activated by bringing the concept of power to mind through a 
word9fragment completion task (see Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995), by asking 
participants to imagine themselves in or simulate the role of a manager or a subordinate 
(e.g., Guinote, 2008; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002) or via a mind9set priming method which 
asks participants to recall either a situation in which they possessed power over someone 
else or a situation in which someone else possessed power over them (Galinsky et al., 
2003). Over numerous studies in the past two decades, these priming procedures have been 
linked to important changes in individuals’ cognitive and emotional responses and social 
behaviors. Among those techniques, the recall priming task by Galinsky et al. (2003) has 
been shown to have far9reaching effect on a variety of behavioral outcomes, including 
individuals’ tendency to generate creative ideas (Galinsky et al., 2008), ability to recognize 
facial emotional expressions (Galinsky et al., 2006) and to ignore peripheral information and 
focus on task relevant details (Guinote, 2007a, 2007b).   
In addition to the behavioural evidence demonstrating differences between 
individuals primed with high or low power, there is also emerging evidence demonstrating 
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differences in the neuro9biological underpinnings of social power. For example, when primed 
with high power (vs. low power), activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus was reduced 
during math performance among female participants. These findings were interpreted to 
suggest that individuals primed with high power demonstrated less cognitive interference 
(linked to the left inferior frontal gyrus) which led to better performance results (Harada, 
Bridge, & Chiao, 2013).   
Two prominent theories have been drawn on to explain the effects of social power on 
cognition, affect, and behavior. The Approach9Inhibition Theory proposed by Keltner and 
colleagues (2003) argues that holding power activates approach9related tendencies (e.g., 
focusing on rewards, appetitive stimuli, automatic processing), while reduced power 
activates inhibition9related (e.g., focus on punishment, aversive stimuli) tendencies. In line 
with this, Van Kleef and colleagues (2008) reported that individuals with a higher sense of 
power are better at regulating emotional responses, show less distress and compassion than 
those with a lower sense of power when having interactions in which the conversation 
partner addressed past suffering. Similarly, it has been reported that individuals holding 
power experience more positive emotions when compared to those who lack power (e.g., 
Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Langner & Keltner, 2008), and that those high in power are less 
influenced by emotional reactions of others (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003).   
The Situated Focus Theory of Power proposed by Guinote (e.g., 2007, 2013) puts 
forward an alternative approach to explain power9related findings in the literature stating that 
high9power individuals exhibit more flexible processing characteristics; they tend to focus on 
what is goal9relevant and what easily comes to mind. This flexibility means that 
powerholders can rely on a range of factors when making decisions, including subjective 
feelings, simple heuristics, or – if they want to – exert more effort to form their judgements. In 
contrast, individuals lacking power are argued to be more detail orientated, vigilant, and to 
act more deliberately. In line with this approach, Guinote (e.g., Guinote, 2001; Guinote et al., 
2002) showed that high9power (vs. low power) individuals use more abstract (rather than 
concrete) language to describe themselves; demonstrating a lack of focus on detail and 
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instead showing a preference for “gist” descriptions. Similarly, Smith and Trope (2006) 
demonstrated that powerholders describe actions with more abstract terms than those 
lacking power. Furthermore, in line with the idea that powerholders are also more flexible in 
her approach, Guinote (2007b) reported that participants were better at switching between 
focusing their attention on configurational (i.e., gist) or detailed9oriented information.  
Taken together, there is considerable evidence demonstrating that power affects 
various cognitive and affective processes. Given the lack of knowledge on emotional 
prosody and social power, we believe these effects warrant further investigation. 
Nonverbal communication and Social Power 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one previous attempt to explore the 
relationship between social power and prosody conveying basic emotions. In a correlational 
and an experimental study, Uskul et al. (2016) demonstrated that holding power is linked to 
lower accuracy in emotional prosody recognition. In the experimental part of this study, 
participants were primed using the above described recall task to prime high vs. low power 
(Galinsky et al., 2003). Immediately after, they engaged in an emotional prosody recognition 
task which required participants to identify the emotional tone of voice used by a speaker 
who uttered so9called pseudo9sentences (i.e., sentences that do not convey emotional 
meaning through lexical9semantic properties). Results revealed that individuals primed with 
low power significantly outperform individuals primed with high power in recognizing the 
majority of emotions conveyed in the task. Together with findings from a correlational study 
which revealed that having a strong generalized sense of power (assessed as an individual 
difference variable) was associated with lower accuracy rates in emotional prosody 
recognition, these findings provide initial evidence that feelings of power (either in the form of 
a generalized or a temporary feeling) can be linked to reduced interpersonal sensitivity in the 
domain of emotional prosody (Uskul et al., 2016).   
There is additional evidence demonstrating that power affects recognition of basic 
emotions conveyed through other communication channels (e.g., facial expressions). 
However, this research has yielded mixed evidence showing that both high and low power 
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can increase emotion recognition accuracy. A study conducted by Galinsky and colleagues 
(2006, Study 3) revealed lower emotional facial recognition rates for individuals primed with 
high power when compared to unprimed participants (Study 3). Specifically, participants 
either had to recall an incident where they felt in power (high power prime), or recall how 
they felt on the day before the experiment (no prime/control condition). They were then 
asked to identify emotional facial expressions using a forced9choice task (four response 
alternatives were provided). Non9primed participants significantly outperformed participants 
primed with high power in accurately identifying emotional facial expressions (1.57 vs. 4.54, 
respectively, errors in 24 faces). Similarly, Shirako and colleagues reported lower emotional 
prosody recognition rates for participants primed with high power when compared to those 
primed to feel low in power (Shirako, Blader, & Chen, 2013 [as cited in Magee & Smith, 
2013]).  These data suggest that priming the concept of holding power has a detrimental 
effect on identifying emotions from non9verbal cues.  
Other research contradicts these findings. In a meta9analysis, it was outlined that 
holding power actually correlates positively with non9verbal (emotion) identification (Hall, 
Halberstadt, & O’Brian, 1997). Hall and Haberstadt (1994) also reported that females in 
“subordinate” positions are outperformed by females in “higher” positions when engaging in 
a non9verbal9auditory9decoding task; interestingly, this power difference is only found when 
the test materials were spoken by a female speaker and not by a male speaker. In addition, 
it has been reported that individuals primed with high in power displayed higher emotional 
facial expression recognition rates than individuals primed with low power or not primed at all 
(no difference between the latter two conditions; see Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009, 
Study 3).  
Taken together, the literature provides ample evidence to suggest that social power, 
assessed either as an individual difference variable or a temporary state following a prime, 
shapes interpersonal sensitivity; however, the direction of this effect is not consistent across 
different studies. Crucially, few studies have explored the role of social power in emotional 
prosody processing in particular. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying previously observed 
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power differences during emotional prosody recognition are unknown and warrant 
investigation. We designed the present study to address these points. In addition, we also 
examined sex differences in emotional prosody processing because previous research has 
found sex differences in emotion recognition accuracy (c.f. Hall, 1978) and neural processing 
underlying emotional prosody recognition (Schirmer et al., 2013; Schirmer, Striano, & 
Friederici, 2005).  
 
The present study 
Studies exploring potential brain mechanism differences in interpersonal sensitivity 
between individuals primed with high versus slow power are rare. One exception is a recent 
transcranial magnetic stimulation study (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014) investigating 
human mirror activity as a function of primed social power. In this study, primed (high vs. low 
power) and unprimed participants were stimulated with a TMS pulse while watching video 
clips of hand actions. The power priming procedure used was identical to the one used in the 
present study (Galinsky et al., 2003). The elicited motor evoked potentials were reduced in 
individuals primed with high power compared to individuals primed with low power. This 
reduction was argued to reflect lower levels of motor cortex excitability for high power primed 
participants. In other words, participants primed with high power showed less mirror system 
activation when observing others’ actions and the authors argued that it is this reduced 
motor cortex excitability leading to lower interpersonal sensitivity in these individuals 
(Hogeveen et al., 2014).  
So far no research has examined ERP9correlates associated with emotional 
perception as a function of the recipient’s social power. Thus, the present investigation was 
designed to investigate ERP patterns in response to emotional prosody processing in 
individuals primed with high vs. low power. This endeavor is important given the 
heterogeneous results on the relationship between social power and non9verbal emotion 
recognition reported in the literature. In this study, we ask whether and how differences in 
social power on emotional prosody processing manifest at the neural level. That is, while 
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behavioral studies measuring emotional prosody recognition accuracy are informative, they 
fail to provide insight into the time9course underlying emotional prosody perception among 
individuals primed with high versus low power. This, however, is crucial given the different 
processes (acoustic analysis as reflected in the N1 ERP component, salience detection as 
reflected in the P2 ERP component, meaning evaluation as reflected in the late potential) 
postulated in multi9stage models of emotional prosody processing (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; 
Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Frühholz et al., 2016). If previously observed low emotional prosody 
recognition rates for individuals primed with high power are related to altered acoustic 
extraction or emotional salience detection processes, differences between high and low 
power primed individuals should be detected in early emotional prosody processing stages 
(N1 and P2 components). However, if differences in emotional meaning processes lead to 
emotional prosody recognition rates between high and low power primed individuals, we 
expect to find ERP differences between the two groups in later processing stages (the 
positive potential). Specifically, we would expect less or no modulation of ERP components 
linked to these processes for high power individuals if they exhibit reduced emotional 
sensitivity. Crucially, we can use ERPs to investigate the temporal unfolding of neural 
processes underlying emotional prosody recognition among individuals primed with high vs. 
low power and this permits the examination of three different sub9processes of emotional 
prosody processing: early sensory processing (linked to the N1 component), early emotional 
salience detection (linked to the P2 component) and emotional meaning evaluation of the 
prosodic contour of a stimulus (linked to later long9lasting components). This investigation 
thus allows clarifying the on9line processing mechanism underlying the observed differences 
between high and low power primed in emotional prosody recognition accuracy.  
 



In a between9subjects design,forty right9handed 
undergraduate students (22 women, Mage = 22.39) were randomly assigned to a low (n = 20; 
10 women) or high (n = 20; 12 women) power prime condition. As outlined above, the goal of 
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this investigation was to explore emotional prosody perception in these two participant 
groups (high vs. low power prime condition). Sample size was determined on the basis of 
effect sizes observed in previous ERP studies (e.g., Paulmann & Kotz, 2008).  The 
procedures used to prime high vs. low power and the emotion recognition task were identical 
to those used in our previous study (Uskul et al., 2016) and as introduced by Galinsky and 
colleagues (2003).  This priming method has been shown to effectively induce a feeling of 
holding or lacking power as indicated in differences of self9reported power scores (i.e., 
manipulation check). Thus, following this commonly employed procedure, we asked 
participants to recall and describe a particular incident in which they had power over another 
individual or individuals (high power prime) or to recall and describe an incident in which 
someone else had power over them (low power prime). All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision and none reported any hearing impairments or 
psychiatric/neurological conditions. Participants were also asked to report their daily intake 
of caffeine, alcohol, and nicotine and no unusual reports were found. Participants were either 
compensated financially for their participation or received course credit. 
 After preparation for EEG recordings, participants were seated in a shielded chamber 
at a distance of approx. 100 cm in front of a monitor. Priming with high or low power 
occurred after EEG preparation, just before the recognition task started. In the recognition 
task, participants were asked to indicate which emotional tone of voice the speaker had used 
by clicking on one of seven response options displayed on screen. Five practice trials were 
presented before a total of 196 sentences were pseudo9randomly presented over seven 
blocks. In each block, an approximately equal amount of different emotional prosodies was 
presented. Each block of 28 sentences was followed by a short break. A trial worked as 
follows: a fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen for 250 milliseconds. After 
the fixation cross disappeared, a sentence was played via speakers, followed by the 
response screen which stayed until participants made their choice. Response options were 
labelled as anger, disgust, fear, happy, surprise, sad, neutral. A blank screen (inter9stimulus 
interval) was presented for 1000 milliseconds before the next trial began. No time limitation 
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was imposed on participants but they were encouraged to respond as quickly and accurately 
as possible. Run9time of experiment was approximately 30 minutes.  
Following the completion of the EEG experiment (i.e., emotion recognition task), 
participants responded to a 79item manipulation check that assessed how they felt in the 
described incident they were asked to recall (in9control, powerful, independent, weak, 
dominant, powerless, and in9charge; 1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree). The 
manipulation check administered after the EEG study confirmed that participants in the high 
power condition (M = 5.63, SD = .87) perceived themselves as having significantly more 
power than those in the low power condition (M = 3.85, SD = .83), t (38) = 6.65, p < .001. 
Materials used in the present study were taken from a published inventory 
(Paulmann & Uskul, 2014). For this inventory, 28 so9called pseudo9sentences (e.g., Flotch 
deraded the downdary snat) were intoned by a British actress in 6 different emotions (anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, surprise, and sadness) or in a neutral tone of voice (see Paulmann 
& Uskul, 2014 for details). The advantage of using pseudo9sentences is that emotional 
connotation can only be extracted from prosody and not from content. Table 1 lists main 
acoustic parameters for the stimuli split by emotional category.  
 
99 Insert Table 1 about here 99 


The EEG was recorded from 63 Ag–AgCl electrodes mounted on a 
custom9made cap (waveguard) according to the modified extended 10–20 system using a 72 
channel Refa amplifier (ANT).  Signals were recorded continuously with a band pass 
between DC and 102 Hz and digitized at a sampling rate of 512 Hz. Electrode resistance 
was kept below 7 KT. The reference electrode was placed on the left mastoid and data was 
re9referenced offline to averaged mastoids. Bipolar horizontal (positioned to the left and right 
side of participants’ eyes) and vertical EOGs (placed below and above the right eye) were 
recorded for artifact rejection purposes using disposable Ambu Blue Sensor N ECG 
electrodes. CZ served as ground electrode. Data were filtered offline with a cut9off of 30 Hz 
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(using an FIR9Filter provided by EEP) and a baseline correction was applied using the 
EEProbe cntaverage function. For each ERP channel, the mean of our baseline time9window 
(9200 to 0 ms) was subtracted from the averaged signal. Additionally, ERPs were filtered 
offline with a 7 Hz low9pass filter for graphical display, only. Data were inspected visually in 
order to exclude trials containing extreme artifacts and drifts, and all trials containing EOG9
artifacts above 30.00 UV were rejected automatically using the software EEProbe and the 
cntreject function. In total, approximately 19% of data was rejected (range for emotional 
categories: 17.6% 9 20%). All trials that were not contaminated with artifacts were in an 
epoch of 800 milliseconds time9locked to the sentence onset, with a 200 milliseconds 
prestimulus baseline. 


 
Electrodes were grouped according to scalp regions of interests (SROI). Each SROI 
defined a critical region of scalp site: Left frontal: F5, F3, F1, FC5, FC3, FC1; left central: C5, 
C3, C1, CP5, CP3, CP1; left posterior: P5, P3, P1, PO7, PO3, O1; right frontal: F6, F4, F2, 
FC6, FC4, FC2; right central: C6, C4, C2, CP6, CP4, CP2; and right posterior: P6, P4, P2, 
PO8, PO4, O2. This electrode grouping approach allowed us to keep the number of 
electrodes in each SROI constant while covering a broad scalp range to explore 
topographical differences. ERP mean amplitudes measured at frontal, central, and posterior 
SROIs created the factor region (frontal, central, parietal), and ERPs measured at right and 
left hemisphere SROIs established the factor hemisphere (right vs. left) in the statistical 
analysis. Following previous approaches (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013) 
as well as ERP guidelines (e.g., Luck, 2005), ERP9time windows were selected based on a 
combination of the following strategies: visual inspection, previous evidence, and 
determining peak latency. Based on visual inspection and after determining peak amplitudes 
(using the avrretrieve function of EEProbe), early time9windows from 1309170 ms (N1) and 
from 200 to 250 ms (P2) after sentence onset were chosen as the critical time frames for the 
components of interest. In addition, a later time9window ranging from 450 to 850 ms after 
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sentence onset was analyzed based on previous evidence (Paulmann et al., 2013) and 
visual inspection. Following our previous approach (Paulmann, Pell, & Kotz, 2008), we report 
omega9squared (W2) as an effect size estimator. 2 can be described as the coefficient of 
determination, which represents the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for by the independent variable and is interpreted similar to r2 (see Olejnik & 
Algina, 2003).  


Accuracy rates were determined by counting correct responses 
to prosodic stimuli, dividing them by the total number presented in each category and then 
multiplying them with 100 (to obtain percentages, rather than proportions).A mixed model 
ANOVA with emotional prosody recognition as the dependent variable and type of emotion 
as a within9subjects factor and power prime and participants’ sex as between9subjects 
factors revealed a significant main effect of participant sex, F (1, 36) = 4.90, p = .03, T2 = 
.09, showing that female participants were more accurate at recognizing emotions (M = 
76.53%, SD = 7.11) than male participants (M = 69.93%, SD = 12.35). Individuals primed 
with low power (M = 74.29%, SD = 10.01) showed slightly higher emotion recognition rates 
compared to individuals primed with high power (M = 72.83%, SD = 10.66), but this 
difference was not significant, F (1, 36) = .67, p = .42, T2 = .0. In addition, a significant main 
effect of emotion was found, F (6, 216) = 45.16, p < .001, T2 = .06. Anger was recognized 
best (M = 89.82%, SD = 10.96), followed by neutral (M = 88.66%, SD = 11.32), sadness (M 
= 80.00%, SD = 14.19), disgust (M = 77.41%, SD = 16.46), surprise (M = 66.87%, SD = 
18.26), fear (M = 61.07%, SD = 16.96), and happiness (M = 51.07%, SD = 20.63). No 
significant interactions between type of emotion x participant sex, F (1, 36) = .62, p = .71, T2 
= .0, or emotion x power prime, F (1, 36) = .88, p = .51, T2 = .0, were found. Table 2 displays 
behavioural effects.  
 
99 Insert Table 2 about here 99 
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. We entered the mean ERP amplitudes obtained in each of the 
processing stages into mixed ANOVAs with emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, 
happiness, pleasant surprise, neutral), region (frontal, central, posterior electrode9sites), and 
hemisphere (right vs. left) as within9subjects factors and power condition (high vs. low) and 
participant sex (male vs female) as between9subjects factors. For the ease of reading, below 
we only report significant main effects and interactions involving the critical factors emotion 
and power. We also report effects approaching significance (p < .08) to inform readers about 
emerging patterns. To correct for multiple comparisons of posthoc contrasts, we adopted the 
formula proposed by Keppel (1991) which revealed a modified p value of .017 obtained by 
multiplying p of .05 with the degrees of freedom associated with the conditions tested, 
divided by the number of comparisons. We thus used this value to determine the 
significance level of the observed effects obtained in our analyses below. A Geisser9
Greenhouse correction was applied to all repeated measures with greater than one degree 
of freedom in the numerator. To confirm that no differences were present between our 
different conditions and/or groups, we ran an additional analysis for the baseline time9
window (9200 to 0 ms time9locked to sentence onset). This analysis revealed no significant 
main effects (all Fs < 0.84 and all ps > 0.97) or interactions (all Fs < 2.27 and all ps  > 0.11) 
confirming that the groups’ amplitudes in response to the different emotional categories did 
not differ at baseline.
 In a time9window between 1309170 ms, a non9significant effect of emotion was 
observed, F (6, 216) = 2.05, p = .08, T2 = .02. This was qualified by a non9significant 
interaction between emotion and participant sex, F (6, 216) = 2.22, p = .06, T2 = .02. No 
other effects reached significance (all ps > .08). 
Within the time9window of 200 to 250 ms, the effects of participant sex, power 
condition, or emotion were not significant (all ps > .20); however, there was a significant 
emotion X region interaction, F (12, 432) = 2.72, p = .025, T2 = .03. Further analyses by 
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region showed a significant emotion effect at frontal electrode sites, F (6, 216) = 3.02, p = 
.01, T2 = .04, but not at central or parietal sites (all ps > .23), suggesting that different 
emotional prosodies elicited differentially modulated P2 amplitudes at frontal electrode sites 
independent of power prime. Specifically, posthoc contrasts revealed that ERPs in response 
to angry prosody differed significantly from ERPs in response to disgust, sad, and pleasant 
surprise prosody (all ps < .017). It also differed marginally significantly from happy (p = .029) 
prosody. No other contrasts were significant below the adjusted p9value of .017.  
Crucially, there was an emotion X power interaction, F (6, 216) = 3.30, p = .01, T2 = 
.04. Follow9up analyses by power condition revealed a significant emotion effect for 
participants primed with low power, F (6, 114) = 3.05, p = .02, T2 = .03, but not for those 
primed with high power, F (6, 114) = 1.41, p = .25, T2 = .01. Posthoc contrasts revealed that 
participants primed with low power showed significantly different ERPs in response to angry 
compared to disgust, happy, and sad prosody (all Fs > 7.10, all ps < 0.017). The contrasts 
between angry prosody and fearful prosody (p = .045), between disgust and sad (p = .042) 
and between neutral and sad (p = .028) prosody approached significance. Finally, there was 
also a non9significant four9way interaction between emotion X region X power X sex, F (12, 
432) = 2.22, p = .06, T2 = .01, for which step9down analyses did not reveal any significant 
effects (ps for all other effects were > .15). These results reveal that early emotional salience 
detection differs between individuals primed with high vs. low power; only those primed with 
low power (and not those primed with high power) showed significantly differently modulated 
P2 amplitudes across the scalp. Figure 1 displays the P2 effects for both power groups 
separately. In addition, Figures 294 show relevant effects in bar graph format. 
	

	An analysis of the later time9window (450 9 850 ms after stimulus 
onset) showed a significant main effect of emotion, F (6, 216) = 3.02, p = .01, T2 = .04, which 
was qualified by a significant emotion X power interaction effect, F (6, 216) = 2.68, p = .02, 
T2 = .03, and a significant emotion X participant sex interaction, F (6, 216) = 2.24, p = .05, T2 
= .02. For the first interaction effect, we conducted a step9down analysis by power prime 
which revealed a significant emotion effect for the group primed with low power, F (6, 114) = 
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4.84, p = .001, T2 = .05, but not for the group primed with high power, F (6, 114) = .68, p = 
.66, T2 = 0. Posthoc contrasts for the group primed with low power revealed significant ERP 
differences for the comparisons between anger and happy prosody, anger and neutral 
prosody, sadness and neutral, and surprise and neutral prosody (all Fs > 11.10, all ps < 
0.017). Marginally significant differences were found for the contrasts between anger and 
disgust prosody (p = .044), happy and surprise (p = .018), anger and fear (p = .054), fear 
and neutral (p = .045), as well as between happy and sad prosody (p = .031) (see Figure 1 
for the direction of differences).  
For the emotion X participant sex interaction, step9down analyses by participant sex 
revealed a significant emotion effect for women, F (6, 126) = 2.78, p = .03, T2 = .03, but not 
men, F (6, 102) = 2.31, p = .07 T2 = .02. For female participants, posthoc contrasts revealed 
significant differences between ERPs in response to anger and happy and happy and 
surprise (all ps < .017), and marginal effects for anger vs. neutral (p = .037), fear vs. happy 
(p = .034), happy vs. sadness (p = .037), and neutral vs. surprise (p = .025).  For male 
participants, posthoc contrasts revealed significant ERP differences between anger and 
neutral prosody, neutral and fear, and neutral and happy prosody (all ps < .017). Contrasts 
between neutral and disgust (p = .036), neutral and sadness (p = 0.024), and neutral and 
surprise prosody (p = .023) were marginally significant. Finally, step9down analyses 
conducted to unfold the marginally significant hemisphere X region x power prime 
interaction, F (2, 72) = 3.08, p = .06, T2 = .01, did not reveal any significant effects. All other 
effects resulted in ps > .10). Late component effects are displayed in Figures 597 in bar 
graph format.  
In sum, participants primed with low power showed significantly differently modulated 
amplitudes in response to the different emotional prosodies at later processing stages, 
whereas no such amplitude differences in response to the different emotional prosodies 
were found for those primed with high power. While both male and female participants 
showed significantly modulated LPP amplitudes, individual emotion contrasts differed 
depending on participants’ sex.  
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 The role of social psychological factors in emotional prosody processing has been 
underexplored despite evidence linking power to differences in interpersonal sensitivity in 
other domains (e.g., face processing). For the first time, we explored ERP9patterns of 
individuals primed with feeling either low or high in power, focusing on three different 
processing stages. The goal of this investigation was to shed light on the underlying 
mechanisms of previously reported power differences observed in behavioural data (Uskul et 
al., 2015). Our data did not reveal any differences between low versus high power groups in 
the N1 component, suggesting that the two groups did not differ in how acoustical attributes 
were extracted in this initial sensory processing stage. Examining the P2 component, we 
found that participants primed with low power displayed differentially modulated amplitudes, 
an effect reported for non9primed populations (e.g., Paulmann & Kotz, 2008; Paulmann et 
al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013); this effect was, however, absent among those primed with 
high power. Examining the later component, we found that participants primed with low 
power showed differentially modulated amplitudes in response to different emotional 
prosodies, again similar to unprimed populations (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2011, 2013; 
Schirmer et al., 2013), but those primed with high power did not. These findings provide 
novel evidence for the temporal dynamics underlying emotional prosody perception in high 
versus low power primed participants.  
In the light of studies that have repeatedly linked the P2 to early emotional (salience) 
detection based on the analysis and integration of emotionally relevant acoustic cues (c.f. 
Paulmann & Kotz, 2008; Paulmann et al., 2011, 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013), the current 
findings reveal that only individuals primed with low power engage in initial, rapid evaluation 
of emotionally relevant acoustic attributes. This difference could be accounted for by at least 
two explanations. First, it might be due to the tendency of those in low power to focus on 
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detail (e.g., Smith & Trope, 2006; Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008). Attention to 
detailed acoustic changes is crucial during early (P2) stages of emotional prosody 
processing as forming an emotional ‘Gestalt’ is only possible if integration of the various 
relevant acoustic cues remains unhindered. Thus, if high power individuals pay less attention 
to these complex acoustic fluctuations than low power individuals, then their emotional 
prosody differentiation as reflected in the P2 would be altered. This explanation is in line with 
recent work showing that low power increases vigilance in the processing of perceptual cues 
(Weick, Guinote, & Wilkinson, 2011), whilst the lack of control that accompanies low power 
motivates individuals to integrate information into a coherent whole (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008).  
Alternatively, individuals primed with low power (compared to those primed with high 
power) may have simply been more motivated to engage with the stimulus materials. It has, 
for instance, been argued that individuals lacking power have an increased motivation to do 
well on a task (i.e., to be particularly accurate; c.f. Fiske & Depret, 1996). Moreover, it has 
been argued that high (primed) power individuals display more of a goal9directed behavior 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007). In a situation where there is no immediate 
benefit (as in the current task), individuals primed with high power might choose not to pay 
attention to subtle differences in acoustic attributes (which is in line with the idea that they 
prefer to process the “gist” of information; see Guinote, 2013). It is worth noting that 
(priming) high power is often associated with increased performance in cognitive tasks (see 
Weick et al., 2011, for a discussion of this literature), which would argue against an 
explanation in terms of task disengagement. That said, this possibility remains to be tested 
in future studies where individuals primed with high versus low power are asked to carry out 
the same task as the one used in the current research, this time within a meaningful context 
(e.g., using a cover story that would encourage them to do particularly well in this task to win 
a prize at the end).  
Finally, the following interpretation of the data should also be considered. Looking at 
the means of ERP amplitudes suggests that increased amplitudes were observed for the 
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high power prime group when compared to the low power prime group (though note that this 
difference was not supported statistically). If increased amplitudes are a sign of increased 
processing efforts, it could be speculated that individuals primed with high power focused too 
much on acoustic details (rather than not enough). If true, getting “caught up” in emotionally 
relevant details, or absorbing too much information, could then lead to a lack of 
differentiation between emotions. How this over9attentive processing approach could result 
in reduced emotional recognition rates for individuals primed with high power (as observed 
previously) remains to be tested in future studies; however, one speculation is that over9
vigilant processing actually leads to a reduced ability to identify relevant patterns (e.g., 
acoustic cue combinations) needed for successful emotional prosody recognition. In other 
words, too much focus might be put on individual cues, rather than their appropriate 
combination.  
In addition to early processing differences, we also found differences in the 
subsequent processing stage as a function of power prime. Again, similar to unprimed 
participants (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013), only the low power group 
showed differently modulated late components in response to different emotional 
expressions. Previous reports (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2011, 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013) 
have functionally linked these later long9lasting components to an enhanced, continuous 
analysis of stimuli that carry potentially relevant affective information (i.e., an in9depth 
analysis of emotionally relevant stimuli to ensure appropriate social behavior, for example 
fight vs. flight). Building on these findings, the current data point to the possibility that the 
group primed with high power failed to consistently exhibit such an in9depth analysis. This is 
perhaps not surprising given that their differentiation of emotional prosodies at an early stage 
was also not significant (see Schirmer et al., 2013 who suggest that different processing 
stages are not independent of each other). We have argued that the later, more thorough 
analysis of emotional prosodic attributes relies on processes that emphasize a “continuous 
combinatorial analysis of emotional features” (Paulmann et al., 2011, pg. 10). If true that 
people primed with high power do not generally steadily scan for manifold variations in the 
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acoustic signal, then the lack of emotional differentiation at a late processing stage is not 
surprising. Alternatively, the lack of late differentiation between emotions might indicate that 
participants primed with high power disengaged with the process of explicit evaluative 
judgements (i.e. linguistic labelling, or categorizing) of specific emotions. Schirmer and Kotz 
(2006) proposed that this evaluative judgement is one of the last stages of emotional 
prosody processing. Future studies will have to try and tease apart the two alternative 
interpretations (failure of in9depth processing vs. failure to engage with labelling emotions).  
Finally, (primed) power has also been linked with a disregard for other individuals 
and with a decline in the motivation to affiliate with others (e.g., Case, Conlon, & Maner, 
2015; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). These behavioral tendencies could also 
explain the lack of engagement with emotional stimuli. Specifically, it could be argued that 
powerholders were less likely to engage with the speakers’ emotional states (that is they did 
not want to take their perspective, or felt less inclined to show “compassion” in response to 
their emotional utterances), similar to how they have been shown to disengage with 
language of others that expressed distress (Van Kleef et al., 2008).    
In our previous studies (Uskul et al., 2016), results suggested that priming individuals 
with high power reduced emotional prosody accuracy rates rather than low power prime 
leading to enhanced emotional prosody recognition rates. Although visual inspection of the 
behavioural recognition rates suggest that those primed with low power perform better than 
those primed with high power, this comparison failed to reach significance. In our previous 
studies (i.e. those that aimed to explore behavioural differences), we tested more than 200 
participants all together. Here, given that the focus was on ERP differences, sample size 
was limited to 40 participants. It can thus be speculated that the failure to replicate the 
behavioural significance is related to sample size.  Nevertheless, the previous observation 
that those primed with low power perform similarly to those without power (Uskul et al., 
2016) was mirrored in the current ERP results where ERP components linked to emotional 
prosody processing observed in those primed with low power are comparable to 
components previously observed in non9primed populations (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2013; 
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Schirmer et al., 2013). It can thus be speculated that priming high power leads to changes in 
brain processing mechanisms (e.g., processing mechanisms underlying emotional prosody 
perception). This speculation fits well with recent evidence demonstrating that priming power 
can impact on neural responses in other domains (e.g., mirroring other people’s actions), 
such as reduced motor9evoked potentials observed in those primed with high power when 
compared to individuals primed with low power (Hogeveen et al., 2014).  
The present study also allows for commenting on the relationship between social 
power and individual emotions as expressed through prosody. It has been suggested that 
low power individuals will engage more with negative affect, while high power individuals 
might engage more with positive affect (c.f. Keltner et al., 2003). Specifically, it has been 
argued that negative affect is experienced more strongly by low power individuals, while the 
experience of positive emotions is heightened in high power individuals. Moreover, it has 
been suggested that high power links to approach9related emotions, while lower power links 
to avoidance9related emotions (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003). The present findings are, however, 
difficult to reconcile with valence9based or approach/inhibition9based accounts. In particular, 
we found that high power dampened individuals’ responses to both positive emotions (e.g., 
happiness) and negative emotions (e.g., fear) in the ERP data. A similar pattern was 
observed for approach9related emotions (e.g., anger) and for inhibition9related emotions 
(e.g., disgust, surprise). Thus, the differential processing of prosodies documented in the 
present research appears to be indicative of a more general phenomenon that occurs across 
a range of emotions.  
Overall, perhaps the most consistent and strongest differentiation between low and 
high power primed individuals was observed for acoustic signals of anger. Relative to other 
emotions, angry prosodies elicited strong amplitudes and a distinct pattern of cortical activity 
in low power, but not in high power individuals. Anger is a dominance9signaling cue, and as 
such the finding that power reduces the processing of acoustic anger signals is particularly 
intriguing, albeit consistent with recent evidence that suggests high power can act as a 
buffer and reduce individuals’ sensitivity to hostile behaviors (Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic, 
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2014).  
Taken together, these data, for the first time, suggest that individuals primed with 
high or low power listen to emotional language stimuli in a non9identical fashion. Future 
studies are needed to clarify the extent to which individual emotion effects as observed here 
can be replicated and extended with different stimuli containing different emotional acoustic 
variables. In the current study, only a moderate amount of prosody items was presented to 
participants, to ensure that experimental run time stays within norms reported for emotional 
prosody studies (e.g., 45 minutes maximum). To help increase the signal9to9noise ratio, 
future studies could minimize the amount of emotional tones tested and increase participant 
numbers in each priming group.   
Finally, it is noteworthy that our data also revealed differences between women and 
men when recognizing emotions from the voice. Specifically, sex differences were found in 
the early N1 component; the data showed that females’ N1 response differed between 
neutral and negative (anger and sadness) and neutral and positive (happiness) prosody, 
while the same differentiation was not found for male participants. However, this early 
sensory processing difference did not lead to differences in early salience detection as the 
P2 component did not vary as a function of participant sex. Lastly, the later ERP effect 
previously linked to more enhanced processing of emotional prosodies, only differed slightly 
between female and male participants as reflected in differences in a subset of individual 
emotion contrasts. Our findings thus add to the body of evidence which suggests that 
women and men can (but do not always do) differ in their evaluation of emotional (prosodic) 
characteristics (e.g., Schirmer & Kotz, 2003; Schirmer et al., 2002).  


In contrast to some previous reports (e.g., Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 
2013), the current study presented fewer than 30 trials per emotional category condition as 
we followed the same experimental design applied in Uskul et al. (2016). This number was 
further reduced after removing EEG artefacts, leading to a lower signal9to9noise ratio of our 
data in comparison to the majority of previous studies. Although the lack of emotion 
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differentiation effects observed in the group primed with high power are unlikely directly 
linked to this limitation, given that significant emotion effects were reported in studies testing 
fewer participants (e.g. < 15) with similar number of trials presented (e.g., Paulmann, Seifert, 
Kotz, 2010; Paulmann, Ott, Kotz, 2011), future studies should examine power effects by 
increasing trial numbers. Similarly, the convention in ERP studies is to analyze correctly and 
incorrectly answered trials separately; this sensible approach is particularly important when 
one is interested in the routine applied during a specific process. However, in the present 
study, we were particularly interested in studying the processes associated with participants’ 
performance in an emotional prosody recognition task (i.e. processes that sometimes lead to 
accurate and sometimes to inaccurate identification of a stimulus). Thus, both correctly and 
incorrectly answered trials were included in the analysis. To overcome the problem of 
analyzing trials in a combined way (as was done here), we suggest that future studies 
should reduce the number of emotions tested (and thereby increase trial numbers for the 
remaining categories) and to provide task instructions that might lead to higher error rates in 
participants (e.g., manipulate motivation to do well/not well in the task). This should permit 
analyzing the data separately, leading to the possibility to compare performance across 
groups for processes associated with correct and incorrect identification separately. 
 
 

 
The current study set out to explore ERP9patterns underlying previously observed 
emotional prosody processing differences between individuals primed with high and low 
power. Specifically, we examined power differences using ERPs to investigate online 
processing differences in early and later stages which have been shown to provide 
information about salience detection versus deeper processing, respectively (e.g., Paulmann 
& Kotz, 2008; Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et al., 2013). This allows commenting on the 
time9course of emotional prosody perception and helps explain the underlying mechanisms 
for the observed power differences. In particular, the current results suggest that high power 
affects both early and later processing of emotional prosody. This way, the current findings 
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contribute to the emerging literature on the role of power in neural processes related to 
interpersonal sensitivity (Hogeveen et al., 2014) and point to a need to take into 
consideration the role that social psychological variables can play in the neural 
underpinnings of emotional prosody processing.  
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Fundamental Frequency (f0) and Intensity (dB) Values from Acoustical Analyses Carried Out 
for Stimulus Materials 
       
 
Emotion 
Mean 
F0 (Hz) 
Range 
F0 (Hz) 
Mean 
dB 
Range 
dB 
Duration 
(seconds) 
 Anger 258.0 241.6 53.7 78.0 2.2 
 Disgust 242.1 319.8 54.1 43.8 2.7 
 Fear 299.3 211.3 53.1 55.8 2.2 
 Happiness 256.7 199.4 54.8 43.1 2.1 
 Neutral 211.3 167.8 51.6 41.8 2.4 
 Surprise 311.5 378.8 55.8 45.5 2.0 
 Sadness 256.0 166.5 48.6 67.4 2.3 

Note: Range refers to the difference between the highest and lowest F0 value in an 
utterance. 
 
"$
Mean Recognition Rate for Each Emotion by Power Prime   
Emotion 
power prime anger disgust fear happiness neutral sad surprise 
Low 91.79 80.18 62.14 48.57 90.71 79.29 67.32 
 (8.76) (16.03) (18.08) (19.88) (9.01) (14.41) (19.78) 
High 87.86 74.64 60.00 53.57 86.61 80.71 66.43 
 (12.71) (16.83) (16.16) (21.58) (13.15) (14.30) (17.12) 
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Note: Standard deviations are provided in brackets. 
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Figure 1. Early and late ERP effects as a function of power prime (high vs. low) at selected 
electrode9sites. Waveforms show the average for neutral (green), happy (red), and angry 
(blue) sentences from 100 ms before stimulus onset up to 800 ms after stimulus onset. 
 
Figure 2. The illustration shows P200 mean amplitudes (in Microvolt) for each emotional 
category for the High Power Primed Group. 
 
Figure 3. The illustration shows P200 mean amplitudes (in Micro Volt) for each emotional 
category for the Low Power Primed Group. 
 
Figure 4. The illustration shows P200 mean amplitudes (in Micro Volt) for each emotional 
category at frontal electrode sites.   
 
Figure 5. The illustration shows mean amplitudes (in Micro Volt) for the late component for 
each emotional category.   
 
Figure 6. The illustration shows mean amplitudes (in Micro Volt) for the late component for 
each emotional category for participants primed with high power.   
 
Figure 7. The illustration shows mean amplitudes (in Micro Volt) for the late component for 
each emotional category for participants primed with high power.  
Page 38 of 46Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
39 
 
&' 
We would like to thank Sarah Harris, Alexandra Dylman and Desire Furnes for their help with 
stimulus preparation and data collection. This work was supported by the Department of 
Psychology (University of Essex) Research Promotion Fund awarded to Silke Paulmann. 
Page 39 of 46 Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology



	


 !!"##
"$##

%#&'(##&(##)*


Page 40 of 46Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
  
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
High Power Group  
P200 
 
Page 41 of 46 Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
Low Power Group  
P200 
Page 42 of 46Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
  
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
P200: Frontal ROI 
Page 43 of 46 Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
  
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
Late Component 
Page 44 of 46Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
  
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
Late Component 
High Power 
Page 45 of 46 Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
 
 
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
anger disgust fear happiness neutral sadness surprise
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
 (
µ
V
) 
Late Component 
Low Power 
Page 46 of 46Psychophysiology
Psychophysiology
